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ABSTRACT: We apply the recent generalized sup augmented Dickey-Fuller (GSADF) test for explo-
sive bubbles (Phillips et al., 2012) to monthly time-series for food, beverages, agricultural raw material, 
cereals, dairy, meat, oils and sugar indices and a total of 28 agricultural commodities between 1980-2012. 
We found price bubbles occurred for 6 out of the 10 indices studied and for 6 out of the 28 commodities 
within food markets. Results from the tests can help implementing policies aimed at mitigating effects of 
future price bubbles to targeted food commodity markets that may require special attention.
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Detectando burbujas en los mercados de productos agrícolas
RESUMEN: Aquí aplicamos un test estadístico recientemente desarrollado para la identificación de bur-
bujas explosivas, generalized sup augmented Dickey-Fuller (GSADF) test (Phillips et al., 2012) a series 
temporales mensuales de indicadores de precios de alimentos, bebidas, materias primas agrícolas, cere-
ales, productos lácteos, productos cárnicos, aceites y azúcar así como para un total de 28 productos agrí-
colas durante el período 1980-2012. Se han encontrado burbujas en los precios para 6 de los 10 índices y 
para 6 de los 28 productos alimenticios estudiados. Los resultados de estos tests pueden ayudar a llevar a 
cabo políticas que tengan como objetivo mitigar los efectos de futuras burbujas explosivas en mercados 
de productos agrícolas identificados como aquellos puedan requerir una atención especial.
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1. Introduction
Since 2007 the world experienced dramatic swings in internationally traded food 
commodity prices. In June 2008, December 2010 and more recently in the autumn of 
2012, food prices increased sharply and subsequently declined from their peak, only 
to remain at relatively high levels, as compared with the 2005-2006 average.
Food prices are inherently volatile and addressing the consequences of such 
volatility is one of the most challenging issues facing policy makers, especially in 
developing countries1. Since Gustafson’s (1958) price behavior model for a storable 
staple, over 50 years of empirical analysis have added a lot to our knowledge on the 
behavior of commodity and food prices. We know that unrelated commodity prices 
move together (Pindyck and Rotemberg, 1990); they are highly autocorrelated and 
significantly volatile (Deaton and Laroque, 1992); their long run downward trend 
(Grilli and Yang, 1988) is subject to violent upward spikes which are not matched 
by the few, or no downward spikes (Deaton and Laroque, 1992); the shocks that ge-
nerate these spikes tend to have a persistence effect on prices over the years (Cashin 
et al., 2000); and regarding causes of commodity prices following cyclical patterns, 
there is little evidence that such cyclical patterns are determined by business cycles 
(Cashin et al., 2002).
In spite of what we have learned about commodity price behavior during the last 
50 years, the 2008 commodities price episode revealed a gap in our knowledge on the 
drivers that determine commodity, and especially food prices. Since 2005 real food 
prices have exhibited an upward trend, and in mid-2008 they increased in a violent 
surge by more than 60 percent, as compared to the 2007 levels. Since then food pri-
ces have remained at a level significantly higher than  the average of the 2000-2005 
period and exhibited large fluctuations, with slums followed closely by booms in 
2009, 2010 and 2012 as shown in Figure 1. Indeed, the evidence so far suggests that 
volatility is both persistent and increasing (FAO, 2011; Rapsomanikis, 2011) with the 
macroeconomic environment and climatic shocks generating wide price movements.
Persistent food price volatility can have significant economic and social effects, 
especially on developing countries. In the short run, for net food importing develo-
ping countries price shocks can negatively affect the balance of payments, foreign 
currency reserves and worsen the ability to implement social safety programmes. In 
the longer run, the diversification of activities to minimize exposure to price risk in-
hibits efficiency gains from specialization in production and hinders the development 
of the agricultural sector (Kurosaki and Fafchamps, 2002). Income risks may also 
blunt the adoption of technologies necessary for agricultural production efficiency, as 
producers may decide to apply less productive technologies in exchange for greater 
stability (Larson and Plessman, 2002).
1 Recently, the EU has funded a FP7-project on understanding and coping with food markets volatility towards 
more Stable World and EU food systems (ULYSSES). In this project macroeconomic models (e.g. Aglink-
Cosimo, CAPRI) to analysis medium and long term analysis of agricultural markets (Araujo-Enciso et al., 2014).
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FIGURE 1
FAO Food price index
Source: FAO statistics. 
The volatility in world food prices strengthened the attention of policy makers to 
agriculture and fuelled the debate about the future reliability of world markets as a 
source for food. They have also generated a wide array of opinions concerning their 
nature and drivers, and have led to an equally wide array of policy proposals among 
policy makers. 
The debate on whether the drivers of food price volatility go beyond market 
fundamentals is reflected on the wide range of the policies proposed. Investing to 
accelerate agricultural productivity growth to meet increasingly stronger demand 
for food and ease the pressure on prices (FAO, 2011) is a proposal founded on the 
understanding that supply, demand and stocks are the relevant drivers of volatility. 
Proposals such as the establishment of ‘virtual funds’ to intervene in the food futures 
markets by executing a number of progressive short sales are based on the surmise 
that changes in supply and demand fundamentals cannot fully explain volatility and 
speculation, especially in the futures markets (Von Braun and Torero, 2009). There 
is no consensus between economists on the nature and drivers of food price volatility 
and, unsurprisingly, between policy makers on the policies to mitigate it. 
A number of tests and dating algorithms have been developed and used to identify 
rapid increases in prices followed by a collapse, also known as explosive bubbles 
(Phillips et al., 2011; Phillips et al., 2012; Gilbert, 2010; Gutierrez, 2013). Previous 
analyses on agriculture commodities by Gilbert (2010) and Gutierrez (2013) applied 
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the tests developed by Phillips et al. (2011) and focused on four agricultural commo-
dities (maize, soybeans, wheat and rice). In contrast, we apply the more recent gene-
ralized sup augmented Dickey-Fuller (GSADF) test for explosive bubbles (Phillips 
et al., 2012) to monthly time-series for food, beverages, agricultural raw material, 
cereals, dairy, meat, oils and sugar indices and a total of 28 agricultural commodities 
between 1980-20122. We found price bubbles occurred for some commodities within 
food markets.
2. The Debate 
Assessing the extent to which prices reflect fundamental values or not is difficult. 
It entails testing the validity of the present value model. If this fails, the question 
whether one can separate bubble behaviour for the possibility that the model itself is 
misspecified. With such difficulties, examining the evidence in an indirect manner, 
such as exploring both fundamental and non-fundamental factors and reconciling 
their movements with price variation, consists of an approach often encountered in 
the agricultural economics literature. 
A number of authors underline the importance of the fundamental forces of su-
pply and demand in explaining the food prices surges of 2008 and 2010. Growing 
population and income in emerging and developing countries adds significantly to 
the demand for food, while the rate of growth of agricultural production has not kept 
pace with demand (Alston et al., 2010; Bioversity et al., 2012). This alone is suffi-
cient to exert pressure on commodity prices. The growing demand for food and feed 
crops for the production of biofuels is another significant factor, resulting in food and 
energy markets being integrated (Serra et al., 2010; Balcombe and Rapsomanikis, 
2008). Very inelastic derived demand for maize by the biofuel sector contributes 
to both higher prices and greater price volatility (Abbott, 2013). A response to the 
strong demand for grains due to high income growth and biofuel mandates is the de-
cline of aggregate grain stocks relative to utilization. Indeed, the global grain market 
stocks-to-utilization ratio has been fluctuating at a low point since 2005-06, signi-
fying a reduction in the buffer capacity of the global market. Even small supply and 
demand shocks as well as trade policies can generate wide price variations. Wright 
(2010) encapsulates the above strand of literature based on the competitive storage 
model, and concludes that the balance between consumption, available supply and 
stocks is sufficient to justify the recent wide grain price movements. Balcombe 
(2011) found that crude oil prices volatility, exchange rate volatility were determi-
nant factors in many of the commodities studied (e.g. maize, rice, soya oil, rapeseed, 
poultry and pork).
Beyond market fundamentals, dramatic increases in commodity futures invest-
ments by financial institutions as well as commercial traders coincided with the 2008 
food price surge, giving rise to questions on whether the forces of demand and supply 
2 These GSADF tests may identify other forms of behaviour (e.g. regime switching, trends or structural breaks) 
as bubbles.
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alone are sufficient to explain such price developments. While most of the specula-
tive capital is invested in non-agricultural, especially energy futures, investments in 
agricultural futures, reflected by market open interest3, marked a significant increase 
from 2007 to 2008, a period with rapid increases in food prices, especially for maize, 
soybeans and wheat. Once again in 2010, although increases in the global market 
price of wheat were triggered by market fundamentals – reduced supply from Russia 
and the Fine Sea region due to drought and export restrictions, open market interest 
in commodity exchanges increased significantly.
Robles et al. (2009) stress that, along with market fundamentals, trend-following 
behavior such as rising expectations, speculation, hoarding, and hysteria played a sig-
nificant role in the increasing level and volatility of food prices, attributing the 2008 
food price episode partly to ‘speculative bubbles’. UNCTAD (2011), in the similar 
line, lay emphasis on the fact that some aspects of ‘financialization’ of commodi-
ties4, may imply that some activities of ‘non-commercial’ financial participants may 
drive commodity prices away from levels justified by market fundamentals. Non-
commercial investors do not engage in physical markets, as commercial investors do. 
The latter include producers and processors who hedge price risks, while the former 
view commodity futures as assets exhibiting relatively high returns which are nega-
tively correlated with those from other assets, such as equities and bonds, providing 
effective portfolio diversification. However, these non-commercial investors are far 
from homogeneous and their behavior in the market differs. Commodity index funds 
form the majority of financial investors on commodity futures and follow a passive 
futures position. They take long positions and hold these positions by rolling them 
forward (automatically participating in price movements that are also reflected in the 
index price movement). They reduce or increase their overall long positions based on 
investors demand for their shares. 
Hedge funds invest on behalf of rich individuals following discretionary trading 
strategies: they adjust their investments in commodity futures in line with changes in 
asset prices to stabilize and diversify their portfolio (Gilbert, 2010; UNCTAD, 2011). 
The concern is whether these non-commercial investors and their trend following be-
havior feed price bubbles, thus detaching both prices from their market fundamental 
values. Such an impact may also be reflected in the physical markets, as the informa-
tion flow runs from futures to local spot markets (Hernández and Torero, 2010), thus 
distorting price signals. 
Friedman’s (1953) theory on efficient markets underlines that, given rational be-
havior and rational expectations, the price of an asset will always reflect market fun-
damentals. Any divergence of the price from its market fundamental value, caused 
by non informed traders, can be eliminated as it provides an opportunity to informed 
3 Open interest is a calculation of the number of active trades for a particular market calculated using futures and 
options contracts. More specifically, as defined by the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), it 
is the total of all futures and/or option contracts entered into and not yet offset by a transaction, by delivery, by 
exercise, etc.
4 Financialization refers to an increased presence of financial traders, an increase in derivative trading and in-
creased availability of commodity investment products.
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traders to trade against non-informed ones, make profit, and bring the price back 
to its fundamental value. Nevertheless, divergences may occur and although short-
lived, can be frequent. There are many empirical exceptions to the theory of efficient 
markets. For example, informed traders may choose to follow positive-feedback tra-
ding strategies. If they expected prices to continue rising, they will chase the trend in 
the short run, thus feeding the bubble, instead of alleviating it (De Long et al., 1990). 
DeMarzo et al. (2008) point out that even rational and informed traders may choose 
to join trend-chasing due to the risk underlying trading against the majority of partici-
pants. Dass et al. (2008) focus on the incentives fund managers have to trend-chase, 
as they are assessed against the performance of other fund managers. This provides 
strong incentives for herding and accentuating a bubble. 
In the debate of whether agricultural and food commodity prices are unjustifiably 
volatile and detached from market fundamentals, the agricultural economics litera-
ture has mainly centred on analyzing whether the 2008 dramatic food price increases 
were induced by speculative purchases of futures contracts by non-commercial ins-
titutional investors on prices. These analyses do not constitute tests for the detection 
of a bubble, but focus on identifying the possible avenues through which positive-
feedback strategies in commodity exchanges contributed towards price increases that 
could not be explained by market fundamentals. Nevertheless, in these analyses the 
term ‘bubble’ is used liberally. 
Irwin et al. (2009) assess the impact of speculative purchases of food commodity 
futures by index funds on futures prices by means of Granger causality tests and con-
clude that the argument that speculators caused the food price bubble does not hold. 
Sanders and Irwin (2010) investigate the effect of index funds’ positions on the pri-
ces of a number of agricultural and food commodities, finding no impact when quar-
terly and monthly data were used, and only weak evidence when weekly data was 
analysed. They concluded that, overall, the evidence that non-commercial investors 
with passive strategies affect agricultural futures prices is scant. Sanders and Irwin 
(2011a,b) find little evidence of an index-induced food price bubble for a number of 
markets with the exception of soybeans. 
Gilbert (2010) assesses the impact of an index of futures positions in twelve major 
agricultural futures markets on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Food Price 
Index, in addition to the impact of other variables such as the price of oil, money 
supply and the US exchange rate. He concludes that index fund investment is suffi-
ciently large to influence food prices. Gilbert (2010) formally tests for a bubble in 
three food commodities, maize, wheat and soybean, using futures prices and applying 
the methodology of Phillips et al. (2011). He finds clear evidence for a bubble in 
soybean prices in December 2009 and in January 2009, but no evidence for explosive 
behavior in the wheat and maize prices. Gilbert (2010) finding concurs with that of 
Sanders and Irwin (2011a) on the role of index funds in this market, but the inter-
pretation of such results is not easy. First, the question relates to the avenue through 
which non commercial investment behavior would generate a price surge. Gilbert 
(2010) notes that an increase in the demand for futures contracts will tend to raise 
long-dated futures prices and increase inventory demand, which in the short term will 
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result to an increase in the cash price. Recently, Gutierrez (2013) found speculative 
bubbles for wheat corn and rough rice prices and minor evidence for soya bean pri-
ces. Such differences, as pointed out by Gutierrez (2013), may be due to differences 
in the bootstrap method used and differences in the method used and differences in 
the method used to define the critical values.
3. Theory
As part of the discussion regarding the potential analytical frameworks for explo-
sive price behaviour it is important to explain the distinction between rational and 
irrational bubbles. Rational bubbles are those that have the ‘sub-martingale’ property, 
which essentially means that there are only normal expected returns to holding a 
given asset. One can also divide models according to whether they are intrinsic or 
extrinsic. Extrinsic models posit that the actual price is equal to a fundamental price 
plus a bubble component which is not a function of dividends (such as Blanchard and 
Watson, 1982; Evans, 1991; Van Norden and Schaller, 1999; Brooks and Katsaris, 
2005). Intrinsic models either specify the bubble component but make it a function of 
dividends (such as in Froot and Obstfeld, 1991) or posit that the bubble is itself within 
the fundamental price (such as Phillips and Yu, 2011). The particular rationalisation 
developed by Phillips and Yu (2011) depends on the idea that the discount rates can 
be subject to structural change, however the work of Homm and Breitung (2012) de-
monstrate that the this class of tests also has power to detect other forms of bubbles.
Earlier tests such as in Diba and Grossman (1988) tested both stock prices and 
dividends for nonstationarity. Evidence of stationarity after differencing was taken 
as providing no support for the existence of a bubble, while, cointegration between 
stock and dividends would support the conclusion that stock prices did not diverge 
from their fundamental values. Evans (1991) criticised this integration-based appro-
ach, stressing that unit root and non cointegration tests are not effective in making 
a distinction between a unit root or a stationary autoregression and a process which 
exhibits periodically collapsing bubble behaviour. 
The recursive tests proposed by Phillips et al. (2011) are not subject to this criti-
cism, being effective in distinguishing unit root processes from periodically collap-
sing bubbles and date-stamping their origin and collapse. Their methodology is based 
on a repeated application of the augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF), estimating 
through a recursive regression the specification:
[1]
where yt is the logged price of the commodity studies at time t; α, β, φ are pa-
rameters to be estimated; rw is the sample window size; and, k is the lag order. The 
recursive regression involves the estimation of [1] by least squares starting with 
rw = r0 fraction of the sample, and repeatedly expanding the sample forward, with the 
last regression utilising the full sample T. For example, the first regression utilises a 
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subsample τo = [Τ r0] from the first observation of the sample to the k
th observation, 
selected to ensure estimation efficiency. This produces an ADF statistic denoted 
ADFr0. The second regression expands the sample by one observation to the (k + 1)
th 
observation, utilising a subsample τ1 = [Τ r1] and producing an ADF statistic denoted 
by ADFr1. Subsequent regressions expand the sample window size rw, from r0 to 1, 
with 1 being the whole sample and ADF1 corresponding to the whole sample ADF 
statistic. Phillips et al. (2011) by expanding the sample forward, generate a sample 
of ADF statistics and test the null hypothesis of a unit root against the right-tailed al-
ternative of explosive behaviour with the supremum ADF,  , utilising the 
critical values. Although the sup ADF detects periodically collapsing bubbles, date 
stamping its origination and subsequent collapse, Phillips et al. (2012) underlined its 
weakness when there are multiple bubble episodes within the same sample period.  
Econometric analysis of explosive processes using sup ADF has been conducted 
mainly in financial research (Phillips et al., 2011; Phillips and Yu, 2011). sup ADF 
differs from the GSADF in that the former uses a fixed initialisation window whereas 
the latter uses a moving window, which avoids results being sensitive to sample start 
data. Also, the GSADF does allow for the possibility of periodically collapsing bub-
bles (Phillips et al., 2011).
We use the generalised version of the sup augmented Dickey-Fuller (GSADF) 
test recently developed by Phillips et al. (2012), which has been applied to 12 agri-
cultural prices previously (Etienne et al., 2014)5, to test for bubble phenomena. The 
test developed by Phillips et al. (2012) is characterised by its ability to deal with 
multiple bubbles. The first order Augmented Dickey-Fuller regression model used by 
Phillips et al. (2012) is
[2]
In related work, Phillips (e.g. Phillips and Magdalinos, 2007) outlines the asymp-
totic theory behind this class of tests demonstrating its power under some ‘mildly’ 
explosive alternatives. In practice, however, the GSADF tests will detect bubbles that 
might be characterised as highly explosive also.
Following the GSADF approach by Phillips et al. (2011) we allow for variable 
window widths in the recursive regressions. This allows the starting points r1 to 
change within a feasible range. The standard Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests 
the null hypothesis of non-stationarity H0: βr1,r2 = 0 against the alternative hypothesis 
H1: βr1,r2 > 0 which implies explosive behaviour. Significant ADF test statistics in-
dicate a bubble episode. The estimated parameters α, β, φ of model [2] are obtained 
through recursive ordinary least squares (OLS)6. The idea behind is that if an ex-
plosive behaviour exists this will be present over a subsample [r1, r2] of the entire 
sample [1, T].
5 Price bubbles in six agricultural commodities have also been analysed using regime switching (Liu et al., 2013). 
6 We use 10 % of the total sample as the starting sample.
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Phillips et al. (2011) provide critical values of GSADF tests against an explosive 
behaviour. These critical values were obtained setting the lag order to be zero (i.e. 
zero lags). We obtained the finite 90, 95 and 99 % critical values for lag orders set 
from 0 to 12 by numerical simulations, where, as in Phillips et al. (2012), the Wiener 
process is approximated by partial sums of 2,000 independent variates and the num-
ber of replications is 2,000. For our empirical application we set the smallest sample 
window r0 = 0.4. The asymptotic critical values obtained are shown in the Appendix.
Homm and Breitung (2012) investigate a number of methods that have the power 
to reject the no-bubble hypothesis including the SADF test. They demonstrate that 
the SADF test has maximum (and good) power. This paper also demonstrates that the 
tests employed here have power to detect alternative forms of bubbles including that 
of Evans (1991). Thus the theoretical Bubble models elucidated by out by Phillips 
and Yu (2011) need not be the only structural rationalisation for these tests. 
4. Data
We use price indexes for food and beverage and agricultural raw materials as well as 
28 individual agriculture commodity prices (see Appendix for a list of price definitions).
We use monthly price indices data from the Food and Agriculture Organisation of 
the United Nations (FAO), as well as from International Monetary Fund (IMF). The 
FAO indices include the food price index, as well as indices for meat, dairy, cereals, 
oils and sugar from January 1990 to August 2012 comprising 271 observations for 
each index. We examine the IMF indices which include the food and beverage index, 
and indices for food, beverages and agricultural raw materials from January 1980 and 
February 2012 comprising 386 observations.
Data on the 28 individual agricultural commodity prices are collected from the 
International Financial Statistics of the IMF from January 1980 and February 2012 
and deflated using the US monthly CPI obtained from the US Department of Labour. 
Previous work by Etienne et al. (2014) using the same approach considered 12 agri-
cultural future contracts included in the CFTC supplemental commitment of traders 
report that includes maize, soybeans, soybean oil, wheat7, feeder cattle, live cattle, 
and lean pigs, cocoa, coffee, cotton, and sugar. 
5. Results and discussion
We estimate equation [1] allowing for variable window widths in the recursive 
regressions. Phillips et al. (2012) provide critical values of GSADF tests against an 
explosive behaviour using Monte Carlo simulations, setting the lag order to be zero 
(i.e. zero lags). We obtained the finite 90, 95 and 99 % critical values for lag orders 
set from 0 to 12. As in Phillips et al. (2012), the Wiener process is approximated by 
partial sums of 2,000 independent N(0,1) variates and the number of replications is 
2,000. For our empirical application we use 10 % of the sample, as our initial start-
7 Etienne et al. (2014) include maize traded in both the Chicago Board of Trade and the Kansas City Board of Trade.
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up sample, r0 = 0.1, and set the smallest sample window, rw = 0.4. The finite critical 
values obtained are shown in the Appendix.
Table 1 shows the maximum ADF test obtained from estimating the GSADF 
model [2] repeatedly over the feasible ranges r1 and r2. Maximum values greater than 
the critical values reported show evidence of bubble behaviour in the particular index 
or price as the tests reject the null hypothesis   in favour of the right tailed 
alternative hypothesis . The tests provide evidence for bubble behaviour at 
the 10 % significance level for the both FAO and IMF food price indices, the IMF 
food and average price index, the FAO cereals, dairy and oils indices, and the prices 
of wheat, rice, soybean oil, rapeseed oil, sugar and coffee. 
In order to date-stamp the origin and conclusion of the explosive behaviour in the 
series we plot the relevant recursive  statistics (Figure 2).
Our results show bubble behaviour during the end of 2007 and the first months 
of 2008 in six out of the ten indices examined. Our recursive regressions suggest 
that the price surge of 2007-08 is of a different nature than that of 2010 and 2011, as 
no evidence is found of explosive behaviour in indices and prices outside the period 
August 2007 to July 2008. The analysis suggests that price bubbles are relatively 
short lived. With the exception of the FAO food price index, explosive behaviour in 
food prices lasted for a limited period of time amounting to two, three or, at most four 
months, before collapsing.
For the FAO food price index, the evidence suggests persistent explosive beha-
viour from August 2007 until June 2008, while the IMF food and beverages price 
indices bubble behaviour is found during January, February and March 20088. It is 
possible that the food component is the factor behind the bubble behaviour in the 
latter since no explosive behaviour is attributable neither to the beverage index nor to 
any of the individual beverages analysed during the period 2007- 2008. For the FAO 
cereals and oil indices, there is evidence for bubble behaviour from December 2007 
to April 2008, and for the FAO oils index during February and March 2008.
8 Not entirely synchronised explosive behaviour of indices may be attributable to the different aggregation and 
weighting methods. The FAO food price index is trade-weighted and as trade increased at a fast rate during the 
2007-08 period, the results show persistent bubble behaviour.
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TABLE 1
GSADF model results for agricultural commodities
Commodities Max 90 % critical value Lags n
Index
Food and beverage index 2.00 1.87 1 254
Food Index 2.09 1.87 1 254
Beverage Index 0.88 2.11 1 386
Agricultural Raw Material Index 1.41 2.11 1 386
Food Price Index – FAO 3.10 1.93 1 271
Cereals Price Index – FAO 2.98 1.93 1 271
Meat Price Index – FAO -0.04 1.93 1 271
Dairy Price Index – FAO 1.97 1.93 1 271
Oil Price Index – FAO 2.28 1.93 1 271
Sugar Price Index – FAO 1.06 1.93 1 271
Cereals
Wheat 2.24 2.11 1 386
Maize 1.13 2.11 1 386
Rice 4.09 2.29 2 386
Barley 0.85 2.11 1 386
Vegetable oils and protein meal
Soybean 1.28 2.11 1 386
Soybean meal 0.68 2.11 1 386
Soybean oil 2.60 2.11 1 386
Palm oil 1.90 2.53 4 386
Fishmeal 2.01 2.11 1 386
Sunflower oil 1.11 2.29 2 386
Olive oil 1.89 2.29 2 386
Groundnuts (peanuts) 0.80 2.11 1 386
Rapeseed oil 2.09 1.96 0 386
Meat
Beef 1.36 2.29 2 386
Lamb 0.34 2.29 2 386
Swine (pork) 1.51 1.96 0 386
Poultry (chicken) 0.89 2.11 1 386
Seafood
Fish (salmon) 0.80 2.71 6 386
Shrimp 0.00 2.29 2 386
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Sugar
Sugar, free market 1.56 2.11 1 386
Sugar, European import price 1.53 1.87 1 254
Sugar, U.S. import price 3.50 2.11 1 386
Fruit
Bananas -1.44 1.96 0 386
Oranges -0.61 2.11 1 386
Beverages
Cocoa beans 2.07 2.29 2 386
Coffee, other mild arabicas 1.70 2.11 1 386
Coffee, Robusta 2.15 2.11 1 386
Tea 0.38 2.11 1 386
Source: Own calculations.
For the individual commodity prices, the tests provide evidence for bubble beha-
viour in the wheat, rice, soybean oil and rapeseed oil price series all of which have 
exhibited record increases during the first months of 2008 relative to other commo-
dities. In their peak, wheat and rice prices were 350 and 530 percent higher, as com-
pared to January 2002 levels which could mark the beginning of an upward trend in 
food prices. Prices of wheat, soybean oil and rapeseed oil show bubble behaviour 
during February and March 2008. Although in 2010 and 2011, wheat prices surged 
as a result of climatic factors and trade policies, such as the export ban by Russia in 
2010, there is no evidence that prices exceeded their fundamental value. Our results 
are in line with Adämmer and Bohl (2015) who analysed speculative bubbles in three 
agricultural commodities (maize, wheat and soybean) using a momentum threshold 
autoregressive approach. Our results regarding wheat, rice and soybeans coincide 
with Gutierrez (2013) who also found bubble behaviour for wheat and rice and did 
not find evidence of bubbles for soybeans. However, Gutierrez (2013) found evi-
dence of bubble behaviour for maize which we did not find here. Some of our results 
(e.g. soybean oil, wheat) coincide with findings by Etienne et al. (2014). However, 
while Etienne et al. (2014) found bubbles for maize and soybeans this has not been 
the case for our analysis.
Amongst food commodities the strongest evidence for a price bubble occurring 
is for rice, for which the explosive behaviour lasted for three months, from February 
2008 to April 2008, and again in July 2008. 
In sum, we do not detect multiple bubbles in the food price series after the sum-
mer of 2008, a finding that suggests that since that time, food prices respond to the 
fundamental forces of demand and supply.
TABLE 1 (CONT.)
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FIGURE 2
Price trends and GSDAF test statistics
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Although our analysis provides answers as to if, and when food prices exhibited 
bubble behaviour, the results raise a number of important questions related to the 
drivers of explosive
behaviour. As far as the price of rice is concerned, the results concur with the 
panic –driven trade policy reactions of countries in Asia. Export restrictions, in the 
form of both taxes and bans, started during late 2007. In late September 2007, Viet-
nam, the second largest exporter in rice, announced a ban on commercial sales. In 
October 2007, India, the third largest rice exporter, imposed an export tax on non-
basmati rice and in March 2008 imposed a complete ban in March. These export 
bans, in conjunction with aggressive and panic-driven buying by Philippines, the 
world’s leading importer, during March and April 2008 at prices over US$ 1,100 per 
tonne, as compared to an average of US$ 326 per tonne in 2007, contributed towards 
the price of rice being over-valued, detaching from market fundamentals.
The results for bubbles in the wheat and vegetable oil prices are more difficult 
to be interpreted, especially because no explosive behaviour was detected in the 
prices of maize and oilseeds. At their peak in 2008, soybean oil prices increased 
by 410 percent as compared to their January 2002 values, proportionally more than 
those of soybeans which increased by 350 percent. Maize prices also registered a 
significant increase at their peak in 2008 from their January 2002 level by about 
300 percent, a rate lower than that of wheat prices. For all four commodities, markets 
were tight in 2007-08: oilseeds and oils markets suffered from poor growth and low 
stocks; in the wheat market, stagnant production in conjunction with very low carryo-
ver stocks resulted in an extremely tight global market; and, maize prices also faced 
pressure from strong demand from the biofuels industry, although the 2007 record 
crop relatively lessened the strain on the market.
Beyond fundamentals, even if the GSDAF detects price bubbles, it cannot provide 
evidence that these bubbles are the result of trend-following behaviour in the futures 
markets9. Nevertheless, the lack of evidence on explosive behaviour in maize and oil-
seeds prices questions the conjecture that trend-following behaviour in futures mar-
kets has been the driver of food price increases. Maize and oilseeds futures are traded 
in commodity exchanges and, like wheat, their contracts are included in commodity 
indices. There are some differences in index investments movements across these 
commodities, but these do not correspond with our findings on explosive behaviour. 
Between December 2007 and June 2008, the index funds’ net positions on wheat in-
creased from 38.2 % to 41.9 % of the total open interest. During the same six months 
period, for maize the share of the index funds net positions was not as substantial as 
that of wheat, but also increased from 25.8 % to 27.4 % of the total (Gilbert, 2010). 
With such a high share of the wheat open interest held by non-commercial traders, in 
an already tight market, the possibility that the demand for long (buy-side) position 
over a prolonged period of time may have affected prices and generated bubbles 
through strengthening inventory demand, should not be ignored. The size of index 
funds’ wheat net positions come second only to the share of open interest they held 
9 The rationalisation of GSDAF by Phillips et al. (2012) does not include explaining sources of price bubbles.
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on live cattle and lean hogs, which amounted to over 40 percent during 2007-08. In 
spite of this high share, no bubble is detected in beef and pork prices. Nevertheless, it 
is the view of the authors that it is doubtful that index fund investments would have 
a direct impact on meat markets, through strengthening the demand for inventories 
(herds) in a period of high feed prices. The specificities of each food market, in con-
junction with the wide diversity of traders, both non commercial and commercial, 
and their complex trading behaviour over a short period of time, makes the analysis 
of the role of futures markets in the 2007-08 price episode difficult and beyond the 
scope of this article.
5.1 Public policy implications
As pointed out in the introductory section persistent food price volatility can have 
significant economic and social effects. Addressing these effects (i.e. forecasting food 
price volatility and/or preventing the result of food price volatility) is a challenge for 
policy makers. Tests as the one used in this paper serve to spot price situations of 
a rapid increase in price followed by a collapse (i.e. explosive bubbles). However, 
we need to bear in mind that what these tests identify is whether food prices have 
departed from their fundamental value or not. They are not a crystal ball, they cannot 
predict whether a price bubble will occur, but they can serve to evaluate whether 
one has occurred, and it consequently can help prioritising which food commodity 
markets require attention by identifying commodity prices that have shown a bubble 
behaviour. Hence, policies aiming at mitigating the pressure on prices such as the 
investment on enhancing productivity growth could use this type of information to 
focus on those markets that have shown certain tendency toward bubble behaviour 
in the first place. The use of results from these tests in combination with other infor-
mation such as potential factors behind bubble behaviour may also be beneficial to 
prevent future price bubble episodes. Based on our results on a number of commo-
dities (wheat, rice, soybean oil and rapeseed oil) that have shown bubble behaviour 
in the recent years we recommend that close attention should be paid to their price 
evolution and possible factors behind such behaviour should be investigated. On the 
other hand, since fruits, meat, seafood and to a large extent beverages have not shown 
evidence of bubble behaviour, they present low relative risk of bubble behaviour (i.e. 
these commodities are not considered to be a priority regarding spending resources 
on policies aiming at prevent or lessen the effects of commodity price bubbles).  
6. Conclusions
We apply the GSADF test for explosive bubbles to monthly time-series for food, 
beverages, agricultural raw material, cereals, dairy, meat, oils and sugar indices and 
a total of 28 agricultural commodities between 1980-2012. We found price bubbles 
in 6 out of 10 indices (food and beverage index, food index, FAO´s food price index, 
FAO´s cereals price index, FAO´s dairy price index, FAO´s oil price index). For ce-
real markets we found price bubbles in wheat and rice markets. 
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Such rapid changes in agricultural commodity prices may have important imme-
diate effects on the income and welfare of producers, agents along the food change 
and consumers as well as the trading positions of countries (Balcombe, 2009). Two 
important related questions arise.  Are the price bubbles found in food commodities 
of speculative origin? And, are some commodities more prone to suffer price bubbles 
than others? Looking forward, on the first question, while appreciating that most of 
previous analyses do not support such relationship between index fund investing 
and price bubbles (Gilbert, 2010; Sanders and Irwin, 2011a, 2011b; Aulerich et al., 
2014), there is need for further analysis of trading positions of commercial and non 
commercial participants in the futures markets. A price bubble was identified in the 
wheat market, where the share of open interest was held by non-commercial traders. 
However, maize, as well as other commodities are traded in futures markets and 
further research based on disaggregated data on the composition of both commercial 
and non commercial positions and their behaviour during price surges is necessary to 
unravel their potential role in determining price movements. 
With regard to the second question we conclude that a number of agriculture 
commodities are prone to suffer price bubbles and therefore efforts in both identi-
fying and tackling price bubbles should focus on those commodities that have shown 
bubble behaviour in the past. For example, the global rice market is quite thin, with 
major producers and exporters managing domestic markets through export controls 
combined with buffer stocks. Our results show that export restrictions can exacer-
bate or even cause severe disruption and a collapse in confidence on international 
markets. Increased international trade policy coordination in times of crisis can also 
reduce volatility and ensure that global markets can be still a reliable source of food. 
Enhanced trade policy harmonization through more predictable and less discretionary 
policies would convey clearer information and render panic and hoarding less likely, 
resulting in less uncertainty. Therefore, our results are suitable to discern commodity 
markets where explosive bubbles exist facilitating the prioritisation of what markets 
may need intervention or what countries may be at risk regarding the consequences 
of rapid increase in food prices.
From the methodological point of view, an important issue also highlighted by 
Gilbert (2010) and Tothova (2011) is the data frequency (e.g. daily, monthly) used in 
the analysis may be important in detecting bubbles. The fact that we have not found 
more price bubbles may be precisely because of the data frequency used (i.e. using 
higher frequency data such as daily data may have detected bubbles that are disgui-
sed under lower frequency data). Therefore, high frequency data of agricultural pri-
ces, particularly data of commodities that have shown bubble behaviour in the past, 
should be used to detect emerging trends of price spikes. 
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Appendix
Tables A.1, A.2 and A.3 show the critical values at 90, 95 and 99 % level, respec-
tively. Tables show the critical value by lags (0 to 12) and number of observations 
(100 to 500).
TABLE A.1
Critical values at 90 % level by lags and number of observations
Number of lags
Number of observations
100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
0 1.145 1.449 1.593 1.723 1.814 1.892 1.957 2.009 2.045
1 1.267 1.567 1.753 1.868 1.970 2.028 2.111 2.160 2.208
2 1.415 1.748 1.926 2.056 2.153 2.236 2.289 2.343 2.384
3 1.462 1.775 2.004 2.154 2.239 2.331 2.396 2.451 2.501
4 4.607 1.987 2.159 2.311 2.397 2.473 2.534 2.577 2.631
5 1.628 1.988 2.210 2.335 2.435 2.539 2.620 2.688 2.728
6 1.691 2.089 2.317 2.457 2.571 2.678 2.750 2.785 2.841
7 1.768 2.162 2.382 2.514 2.639 2.733 2.800 1.875 2.930
8 1.834 2.258 2.502 2.639 2.733 2.834 2.891 2.961 3.024
9 1.838 2.263 2.465 2.659 2.763 2.855 2.925 2.988 3.051
10 1.953 2.389 2.613 2.763 2.877 2.962 3.037 3.126 3.182
11 1.985 2.439 2.671 2.806 2.930 3.046 3.092 3.161 3.220
12 2.093 2.477 2.749 2.916 3.039 3.132 3.215 3.273 3.325
Source: Own calculations.
Testing for bubbles in agriculture commodity markets 79
TABLE A.2
Critical values at 95 % level by lags and number of observations
Number of lags
Number of observations
100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
0 1.455 1.709 1.863 1.992 2.061 2.140 2.203 2.266 2.308
1 1.589 1.836 2.039 2.163 2.251 2.310 2.374 2.423 2.458
2 1.780 2.061 2.209 2.347 2.426 2.520 2.567 2.618 2.662
3 1.783 2.131 2.331 2.474 2.566 2.649 2.715 2.759 2.789
4 2.015 2.335 2.496 2.605 2.695 2.765 2.836 2.873 2.923
5 2.000 2.334 2.517 2.659 2.759 2.852 2.923 2.974 3.003
6 2.083 2.484 2.664 2.806 2.896 2.992 3.037 3.097 3.138
7 2.168 2.492 2.735 2.881 2.985 3.058 3.109 3.157 3.185
8 2.280 2.645 2.874 2.990 3.061 3.144 3.212 3.260 3.317
9 2.235 2.659 2.869 3.007 3.127 3.218 3.305 3.359 3.418
10 2.350 2.761 2.970 3.127 3.239 3.311 3.378 3.438 3.490
11 2.418 2.821 3.008 3.122 3.250 3.349 3.424 3.476 3.514
12 2.452 2.870 3.103 3.259 3.358 3.445 3.564 3.601 3.654
Source: Own calculations.
TABLE A.3
Critical values at 99 % level by lags and number of observations
Number of lags
Number of observations
100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
0 2.048 2.229 2.381 2.493 2.639 2.716 2.766 2.791 2.803
1 2.160 2.440 2.641 2.738 2.848 2.917 2.968 2.994 3.033
2 2.484 2.667 2.787 2.916 2.993 3.093 3.173 3.222 3.232
3 2.488 2.849 3.003 3.059 3.159 3.241 3.281 3.330 3.346
4 2.751 3.072 3.216 3.254 3.325 3.352 3.431 3.472 3.517
5 2.778 2.977 3.144 3.281 3.377 3.498 3.539 3.576 3.629
6 2.885 3.179 3.296 3.424 3.529 3.589 3.660 3.688 3.736
7 2.972 3.272 3.411 3.539 3.663 3.712 3.786 3.825 3.835
8 3.061 3.325 3.441 3.559 3.684 3.815 3.829 3.864 3.977
9 3.084 3.508 3.678 3.788 3.842 3.890 3.994 4.065 4.086
10 3.225 3.452 3.621 3.752 3.864 3.937 4.025 4.078 4.105
11 3.088 3.545 3.692 3.811 3.893 3.934 3.957 4.017 4.063
12 3.253 3.575 3.792 3.937 4.054 4.162 4.243 4.243 4.307
Source: Own calculations.
